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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND,
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER, ELMER A. WILCOX AND WILLIAM G. HALE
FROM WILLIAM G. HALE
CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS.
People v. McPherson, 115 N. E. 515, N. Y. "Bludgeons." Penal Law
(Consol. Laws C. 40). Par. 1897, as amended by Laws 1915, C. 390, and section
1898, provides for the punishment of any person who carries or possesses any
concealed instrument commonly known as a bludgeon, etc., or any other danger-
ous or deadly weapon. Held, that part of a boy's baseball bat, the upper end
of which had been broken off, is a bludgeon.
CONSPIRACY.
Berstein v. United States,.238 Fed. 923. Variance. The indictment was
for a conspiracy to present and prove a false claim against a bankrupt. The
indictment charged both the conspiracy and the overt act in Richmond, Va.
The proof was that the conspiracy was entered into in the City of Philadelphia,
and that only the overt act of presenting and proving the false claim was com-
mitted in the City of Richmond.
Held, this was not a fatal variance. The conspiracy formed in Philadelphia
is to be considered as having extended into Richmond, where the overt act
in pursuance of it was committed.
CONSPIRACY TO SMUGGLE CHINESE.
Sam Yick et al v. United States, 240 Fed. 60. Criminal Act induced by
government officers. The defendants had approached a certain Chinese immi-
gration inspector with a view to bribing him to let them bring Chinese from
Mexico. The inspector reported this to the chief inspector and the U. S.
District Attorney and was advised by them "to go ahead and try to apprehend
him (Sam Yick) by going in with him." Thereafter several meetings were
had between the inspector and Yick. A verdict of conviction was reversed
on the ground of improper instructions relating to the effect of the acts of
the inspector in bringing about the alleged criminal acts. The court in reversing
the case said, "It is of course, not a matter for this court to say what con-
clusion the jury would or should have drawn from the testimony tending to
show that the alleged conspiracy was first suggested by the officers of the
law, and that they lured the alleged conspirators on to commit the necessary
overt act or acts and thus consummate the alleged crime; all of those matters
being exclusively for the determination of the jury. And while it may be
true that the mere aiding of 'one in the commission of a criminal act by a
government officer or agent does not preclude the conviction of the party
committing the crime, yet where the officers of the law have incited the party
to commit the crime charged and lured him on to its consummation, the law
will not authorize a verdict of guilty."
ERROR.
People v. O'Brien, 115 N. E. 123 (Ill.). When erroneous ruling as to
admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless. A judgment of conviction of
the crime of receiving a bribe, as a police officer, for furnishing protection to
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
certain individuals engaged in operating confidence games, was sustained not-
withstanding certain admitted errors in the reception of improper evidence.
The court said: "It is essential that the defendant shall be accorded all the
rights he is entitled to under the law, and, if errors were committed denying
him substantial rights, a reversal of the judgment of conviction would be
required. It is not necessary, however, to sustain a conviction that the record
should be free from all error, and where guilt is conclusively proven by compe-
tent evidence, and no other rational conclusion could be reached but that
defendant is guilty, it would require more substantial errors than any shown
by this record to justify a reversal of the judgment, and it is affirmed."
For a discussion of the state of the law in Illinois on this question and a
consideration of the principles that ought to control, see a note by Dean John
H. Wigmore in 12 Illinois Law Review 39, under the heading, "New Trial for
Erroneous Ruling on Evidence."
EVIDENCE.
Knoell et al v. United'States, 239 Fed. 16. Testimony of at accomplice. By
the decided weight of authority a jury may rely solely upon the testimony
of an accomplice, but the judge should caution them as to unreliable character
of such testimony and against believing it unless it has been corroborated.
Declarations of the accused. Testimony given before the referee in bank-
ruptcy by those subsequently accused of conspiracy to receive property of the
bankrupt, is voluntary and admissible in the subsequent prosecution though
they were subpoenaed to testify before the referee, if when called they made
no claim of privilege to avoid incrimination. The court said, "They were
attended by counsel, and were examined without claiming the right to be
silent because their answers might criminate them. Clearly the subpoena did
not compel them to testify; it only compelled them to attend; and whatever
testimony they gave afterwards without claiming their privilege was voluntary."
EVIDENCE.
Callahan v. United States, 240 Fed. 683. Complaint b9 victim of rape. In
a prosecution for statutory rape upon a girl under the age of-consent, testimony
that the girl informed a girl acquaintance and friend, whom she met on the
street shortly after leaving the place of the act, of the circumstances and
that she had received compensation, is not admissible as part of the res gestal,
it appearing that the act complained of was not the first act of its kind and
the statement being in the nature of interesting information between intimate
friends, instead of a spontaneous exclamation produced by the shock of an
outrage.
EVIDENCE.
Ruse v. State, 115 N. E. 778 Ind. Bloodhounds. Evidence as to the con-
duct of bloodhounds in trailing persons accused of crime is inadmissible. Even
under the most favorable circumstances it is attended with some degree of
uncertainty, which may readily lead to the conviction or accusation of innocent
persons. "Both reason and instinct condemn such evidence, and courts should
be too jealous of the life and liberty of human beings to permit its "reciption
in a criminal case.'as proof of guilt." Lairy, C. J., and Myers, J., dissent.
Authorities pro and con reviewed.
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INDICTMENT.
People v. Osborne, 115 N. E. 890, Ill. Surplusage.
The following comment is made by the court upon the indictment under
which the defendant was convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill:
While this "indictment could not be used as a model for faultless pleading,
its defects are not such as to destroy the sufficiency' of the charge against
plaintiff in error. It is contended by plaintiff in error that the language in the
first count, 'and the said Harry Osborne in and upon clothing, to wit, coat, of
him, the said Daniel Smith, then and there feloniously and unlawfully did
shoot,' and in the second count, 'and the said Harry Osborne at, against, into,
and upon the clothing of him, the said Daniel Smith, then and there feloniously
and unlawfully did shoot,' is descriptive of the particular manner in which
the offense charged was committed, and while it might have been admitted from
the indictment, having been thus alleged, it becomes an essential ingredient
of the charge made. From this premise it is then argued that the indictment
does not charge the commission of any offense against plaintiff in error,
because it does not state where the clothing was, and that if it was not on
or about Smith's person no assault could have been committed upon Smith
by shooting the clothing. It is also argued that, even if plaintiff in error
deliberately shot into the clothing while it was on Smith's person, and that
was all he was intending to do, that act of itself negatives any intention of
assaulting Smith. On the other hand, the people contend that the language
last above quoted is mere surplusage and should be rejected.
The indictment will not bear the construction sought to be placed upon it
by plaintiff in error. It is quite clear that the language pointed out was not
meant to be descriptive of the assault made, but was simply intended to describe
the effect of the assault. The only reasonable construction which the language
used in the two counts of this indictment will bear is that plaintiff in error
made a felonious assault upon Smith with a gun or rifle with intent to kill
him, and that in making such assault he fired a shot which struck Smith's
clothing. The statement in regard to the effect of the assault was unnecessary
and under the authorities may be treated as surplusage. An averment in an
indictment may be treated on the trial as surplusage and be rejected where it
can be stricken out without vitiating the indictment."
SErriG ASIDE VE IcT.
People v. Jurek, 115 N. E. 644, Ill. Jury judges of law as well as fact.
Under a statute providing that juries shall be judges of the law and fact,
the court cannot direct a verdict of not guilty, but may, if the evidence is
thought insufficient, advise the states attorney, tlat a verdict of guilty, if
returned, will be set aside.
Comment. The absurdity of the law which makes juries judges of the law
as well as the fact has been often commented upon. That it is absurd is fully
conceded except by those who desire additional loopholes for securing the
acquittal of those in fact guilty of crime. The above decision furnishes an
additional reason for changing the law.
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TRIAL-CONDUCT OF COURT. 1 3 I
People v. Lurie, 115 N. E. 130, (Ill.). Remarks of Court as Prejudicial
error. Right of Court to question witnesses.
"The general rule is that the trial judge has a right to ask questions of
witnesses or call other witnesses to the stand in order to ascertain the facts and
elicit the truth as to the points at issue. No well-considered authority has ever
stated that the trial judge is a mere moderator or umpire between the contend-
ing parties. In order to establish justice and prevent wrong, he has a large
discretion in applying the rules of practice; but all this must be done in a fair
and impartial manner, without in any way showing bias for or prejudice against
either party to the litigation. The respective counsel in any case are usually
much more familiar with the facts than the presiding judge, and as a rule
the trial will proceed in a more orderly and satisfactory manner when they
are allowed to examine and conduct the examination of the witnesses. It is
important, however, that the trial judge should also become acquainted with
the facts, and .on this account he may, if necessary to ascertain them, propound
questions to the witnesses. It is the judge's duty to see that justice is done,
and, where justice is liable to fail because a certain fact has not been developed
or a certain line of inquiry has not been pursued, it is his duty to interpose and
either by suggestions to counsel or an examination conducted by himself avoid
the miscarriage of justice; but in so doing he must not forget the function of
the judge and assume that of the advocate."
It is, however, an abuse of discretion for the presiding judge to so frame
his questions as to intimate any opinion as to the credibility of witnesses or to
convey to the jury the court's opinion of the evidence in the case. In this
case, where the evidence of the guilt of the accused was close, the action of
the trial judge in making statements, and asking questions of witnesses in
such form as to lead the jury to believe he thought accused was guilty of
murder as charged in the indictment, and that he thought certain witnesses
for the defense were not telling the entire truth, and that certain witnesses
for the state were stating the facts as they actually existed, constituted an
abuse of his discretionary duties and as the appellate court cannot say that
regardless of this abuse the jury could reach no other verdict, it was pre-
judicial to the defendant.
WHITE SLAVE ACT.
Van Pelt v. United States, 240 Fed. 346. Purpose of Transportation. A
man who procured the inter-state transportation of a girl, with whom he had
had intercourse whenever he sought it during the past three years, for the
purpose of procuring a place where she could remain until after her confine-
ment, cannot be convicted under the White Slave Act, though he accompanied
her and anticipated that he would have intercourse with her after she left
the state, if such anticipation played no part in inducing him to procure-the
transportation. Woods, J., dissenting.
FRom C. G. VERNIER.
ABANDONMENT OF CHILD.
Shelton v. State. Ga. 91 S. E. 923. Application of statute to ureborn child.
A father who, within this state, wilfully and voluntarily abandons his child
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before it is born,-and persists in the abandonment afterwards, leaving it in a
dependent condition, is guilty of a misdemeanor under section 116 of the Penal
Code of 1910; but a father is not guilty under that section unlesg the child has
been born. Accordingly no offense was set out in an indictment charging the
defendant with abandoning his minor child "not yet born," and the court
erred in overruling the demurrer thereto. Bull v. State, 80 Ga. 704, 6 S. E. 178;
Boyd v. State, 18 Ga. app 623, 89 S. E. 1091.
BAIL.
In re Welisch. Ariz. 163 Pac. 264. Effect on bail before conviction of
adoption of initiative measure abolishing capital punishment. Const. art. 2,
sec. 22, provides that all persons charged with crime shall be bailable, except
for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great. Pen.
Code 1913, sec. 1188, provides that a defendant charged with an offense punish-
able with death cannot be admitted to bail, where the proof of crime is
evident, or the presumption great. Section 1189 provides, if the charge is for
"any other offense," accused may be admitted to bail before conviction as a
matter or right. The people of Arizona adopted an initiated measure abolishing
capital punishment for murder. Held, there being no longer any offense punish-
able with death, section 1-189 provides in effect that any person charged with
crime may be admitted to bail before conviction as a matter of right, for the
law-making power can enlarge the constitutional grant, so as to include persons
convicted of crime and give to such persons in all cases the right to be admitted
to bail on appeal.
EVIDENCE.
Damas v. People. Colo. 163 Pac. 289. Repudiated confession as direct
evidence. Under Rev. St 1908, Sec. 1624, declaring that no person shall suffer
the death penalty who shall have been convicted on circumstantial evidence
alone, testimony as to an alleged confession by accused which he repudiated and
denied is not direct evidence which would justify a conviction and imposition
of the death penalty, all other evidence in the case being circumstantial.
A confession repudiated by accused should be received with caution, being
admitted as an'exception to the rule against hearsay and open to many objec-
tions and while testimony as to an alleged confession is direct evidence of
the making of the confession, it is not direct evidence of the facts contained
in the confession.
Gabbert, C. J., and Garrigues, J., dissenting.
FALSE ADVERTISING.
State v. Massey. Wash. 163 Pac. 7. An advertisement that a piano was
$400, but now $200, does not amount to a statement that the market value of
the instrument was $400, but was now $200, so as to render the advertiser
guilty of violating Rem. Code 1915, Sec. 2622-1, declaring that any person who
with intent to sell merchandise publishes an advertisement which is untrue,
deceptive, or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, notwithstanding the
market value of the piano was never $400; the obvious meaning of the advertise-
ment being that its selling price, which had been $400, was reduced to $200.
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JURY.
Perry v. People. Colo. 163 Pac. 844. Jury reading false newspaper article.
The reading by members of the jury of a newspaper article falsely stating the
finding in defendant's cell of articles to effect an escape in case of conviction
requires a reversal; it being impossible to say that it was not, as was its
tendency, prejudicial to defendant.
Garrigues, J., dissenting.
LorTRIEs.
State v. Gilbert. Dela. 100 Atl. 410. Element of chance. A certificate,
stating that a certain article would be given without extra charge to the
holder of certificate bearing number corresponding to the last three figures of
the Philadelphia bank clearings as published, etc., made the rights to such
article depend on chance in the nature of a lottery prohibited by Rev. Code
1915, Sec. 3564, in that it provided a chance to get one of a list of articles
without payment of the full price and a scheme for the distribution of money
or property by chance is a lottery.
The fact that the element of chance pertaining to the purchase of a
ticket goes to the amount of return rather than to the fact of any return
does not prevent its being a lottery, since as it gives the purchaser a chance
to obtain something more than he paid for, the gambling element is there;
the difference between such transaction and a simple wdger being only in
degree.
SENTENCE.
Owen v. State. Okla. 163 Pac. 548. Grounds for modifying sentence in
upper court. The record shows that on September 4, 1916, the defendant was
arraigned, for murder and on September 6th he filed a motion for continuance
based on the absence of material witnesses, one of whom was a non-resident
of the state. On the same day the motion was overruled by the court, and the
defendant was put upon trial. Held, that the affidavit for continuance is
sufficient, because it fails to show that the defendant could procure the attend-
ance of such non-resident witness, and fails to state that he intends to, take
the deposition of such non-resident witness. However, technical objections
should not ordinarily prevent the granting of a continuance, and in this case
the county attorney should have admitted that said witness, if present, would
testify as stated in the defendant's affidavit, and that said affidavit might be
read and treated as the deposition of the absent witness, and for this reason
the judgment and sentence of. death is modified to imprisonment for life at
hard labor.
TRIAL.
State v. Rogers. N. Car. 91 S. E. 854. Effect of improper remark by court
after its withdrawal. In prosecution for cruelty to animals, it was prejudicial
error for the court, during examination of defendant; to say, "Answer yes or
no, and don't be dodging;" and such error cannot be cured by subsequent




People v. Herrera. Calif. 163 Pac. 879. Effect of improperly taking exhibits
into jury room. In a homicide case, where the door through which bullets
were fired was introduced in evidence, as well as blackboard illustrations, the
fact that the jury were allowed to carry such exhibits with them in their
deliberations, though they were not included among the things which the jury
might, by Pen. Code, Sec. 1137, carry into the jury room, does not warrant
reversal; there being no showing that the jury used such articles in their
deliberations, or received any improper impressions therefrom.
SELF-DEFENSE.
People v. McDonnell. Calif. 163 Pac. 1046. Duty to retreat. Where
defendant was violently and inexcusably beaten iff his own home by deceased,
a man of quarrelsome disposition, and ordered deceased to leave the house,
and told him he would kill him if he returned, whereupon deceased apparently
seized a deadly weapon, and turned with manner and language plainly indicating
his intention to kill or seriously injure defendant, defendant was not required to
retreat, even though it would not have increased his peril, but had a right to
stand his ground and slay his adversary if he believed himself in imminent
peril.
